Notice to Whom? Drawing the Line Under Chapter 61A

Banevicius v. Town of Barnstable arose from the sale of a cranberry bog known as the Jenkins Bog in Centerville, Massachusetts.The bog was classified as horticultural land for property tax purposes under G.L. c. 61A, a statute that provides tax benefits for agricultural and horticultural land-owners and gives municipalities a right of first refusal when such land is sold for non-agricultural purposes, and so requires sellers to notify municipal officials before a sale.

In March 2021, the seller, Carolyn Jenkins, sent a certified letter, through her counsel, to the town manager and town attorney enclosing the purchase and sale agreement and a notice of intent indicating that the seller intended to sell the bog to a buyer who planned to discontinue its horticultural use and convert it to residential use. The seller did not, however, provide notice to several other municipal and governmental entities, including the board of assessors, the planning board, the conservation commission, and the State forester. In November 2021, the town attorney sent Jenkins’s counsel a letter advising that Jenkins had not complied with G.L. c. 61A’s notice requirements and requested that she do so.

Abutters and a preservation nonprofit sued the town and the buyer, seeking declaratory relief and mandamus to compel the Town to take action with respect to the c. 61A notice provisions. Both the Town and the buyer moved for summary judgment.The lower court granted summary judgment for the defendants finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing.

On appeal the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. The SJC considered two questions: (1) whether the plaintiffs had standing to assert their notice claim under the declaratory judgment statute (G.L. c. 231A), and (2) whether the plaintiffs could claim relief in the nature of mandamus under G.L. c. 249, § 5 for the Town’s failure to take enforcement action with respect to the notice.

The SJC held that the plaintiffs lacked standing under G.L. c. 231A because the statutory notice and right of first refusal provisions of c. 61A protect municipal, not private, interests and so their claimed injury was not within the zone of interests protected by c. 61A.. The Court warned that according standing to abutters and local conservation groups would turn G.L. c. 231A into a “roving entitlement” to sue, allowing any sale of land under G.L.c. 61A to be unnecessarily delayed by lawsuits from neighboring landowners or others seeking redress for injuries not within the statute’s ambit.

The SJC also held that mandamus relief was improper because the Town had fulfilled its statutory obligation by notifying the seller that its c. 61A notice was deficient and that further enforcement was within the Town’s discretion.The SJC held that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and unavailable for discretionary acts..

Banevicius v. Town of Barnstable establishes that G.L. c. 61A’s notice requirements run solely to municipal officials and entities, and that neither abutters nor preservation nonprofits have standing to assert notice violations under the declaratory judgment statute. Because the statute’s purpose is to preserve agricultural and horticultural land for the municipality’s benefit rather than to protect private property interests, injuries such as impacts on property values or enjoyment of neighboring land fall outside the statute’s zone of interests. Equally significant, a town satisfies its statutory obligations under G.L. c. 61A by notifying the seller in writing of deficient notice, and a court cannot order the town to take further steps.